Political Finance and Democracy in Nigeria


The term ‘political finance’ can be defined as the use of money or the use of other material resources for political activities. It embodies the sources or means through which political activities are sponsored in a given country. The concept of political finance has two broad connotation viz money used for electioneering (campaign funds) and money used for political party expenses (party funds). [1] There are some other forms of political finance but these two will form the basis of our discussion because they form the bedrock of every political activity Nigeria is an emerging democracy and the sources and modes through which political activity is financed bear heavily on the success of the democratic process. ', 'There is a correlation between the manner through which campaign and party funds are raised and administered and the outcome of the election and even the overall performance of the candidate sponsored by this process when such a person emerges victorious. When funds are raised from questionable sources, there is a tendency that a candidate will owe allegiance to such forces that put him in power. Placing no limitations on the amount which an individual or a corporation can contribute to a political party allows money bags the opportunity to hijack not just the party structure but to also corrupt the whole electioneering process with money, making it difficult for there to exist a level playing ground for candidates. It makes the process very expensive putting candidates in moral jeopardy of stealing public money to offset debts incurred during a very expensive electioneering process. It is a vicious cycle that perpetuates corruption and mal-governance.

In Nigeria today, sponsorship of a political party or candidate is effectively a business investment, which the investor must recoup the moment his candidate gets into the public office. The very peculiar nature of our socio-economic environment characterized by hunger and illiteracy make the general public and indeed government agencies susceptible to manipulation by corrupt politicians who take advantage of inadequate electoral laws which create a leeway to unlimited access to political finance sufficient to destroy the electoral process.

There is virtually no limit to the finances which are currently available to the major political parties, and indeed virtually all the political parties in Nigeria today. It does appear that financial strength is what determines who is successful in an election. This trend destroys the integrity of the electoral process which ought to be capable of making today’s winners, tomorrow losers. [2]

The democratization process in Nigeria has constantly been encumbered with grave impediments. The will of the people it has been argued has not really been made manifest in the results especially during ‘civilian-to-civilian’ transition [3] as incumbent governments are rarely defeated due to public funds made illegally available to the ruling party. This underlines the need to appraise the political finance regulatory system in Nigeria with a view to reform especially the enabling laws.

This paper will attempt to concisely analyse the extant legal framework regulating political finance in Nigeria, highlight inadequacies or deficiencies whilst juxtaposing the regime with the political realities of our environment and proffer suggestions on the way forward drawing liberally from the instructive practices of other emerging and ‘advanced’ democracies.


A number of constitutional provisions and legislative enactments relate to political finance. Because of the pride of place that the constitution has as the grundnorm, our analysis will start with the provisions of the constitution relating to political finance. The constitution provides the basic framework for the implementation and the enactment of other laws in the country. The supremacy of the constitution is further emphasised in section 1(3), which provides If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution, this constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void. [4]

In other words, every other law in the country must be in line with the provisions of the constitution. It also follows that any inadequacy in the constitution will automatically taint the provisions of subsequent laws in the same subject matter.

The 1999 constitution in section 221 prohibits any association other than political parties from making political donations The constitution in section 225 provides as follows

(1) Every political party shall, at such times and in such manner as the Independent National Electoral Commission may require, submit to the Independent National Electoral Commission a statement of its assets and liabilities.

(2) Every political party shall submit to the Independent National Electoral Commission a detailed annual statement and analysis of its sources of funds and other assets together with similar statement of its expenditure in such form as the Commission may require

(3) No political party shall-

(a) hold or possess any funds or other assets outside Nigeria; or

(b) be entitled to retain any funds or other assets outside Nigeria

(4) Any funds or other assets remitted or sent to a political party from outside Nigeria shall be paid over or transferred to the Commission within twenty-one days of its receipt with such information as the Commission may require.

(5) The Commission shall have power to give directions to political parties regarding the books or records of financial transactions which they shall keep and, to examine the all such books and records.

The commission was also empowered in subsection 6 of the above section to audit the account of political parties through its staff or professional auditors. The Commission is further empowered by section 226 of the constitution to prepare and submit a report on the financial account of the political parties to the National Assembly and are also authorised to have unlimited assess to the records of the political parties.

The National Assembly is empowered in section 228 of the 1999 constitution to make laws for the punishment of any individual or party who falls foul of the above provisions and the disbursement of annual grants to political parties.


The provision of this law covers virtually every process of electoral activities in the country. Section 76 provides for the oversight function of the Electoral Commission over the activities of the political parties and also provides for a fine of N500,000 for non-conformity by any individual to lawful directives by the Commission in carrying out its supervisory functions. [6]

Section 77 makes provision for a fine of N500, 000 for the contravention of sections 225 (3) (a) and (b) of the 1999 Constitution relating to ownership of foreign asset by any political party and retention of any donation from outside the country. [7]

Section 78 provides for period of time, which the annual account of a political party should cover. It also empowered the Commission to audit the account of political parties periodically. [8]

Section 79 makes provision for a separate financial statement for election expenses as prescribed in section 100 [9] of the act not latter than 90 days after the election. Surprisingly section 100 of the Electoral Act has no provision whatsoever that relates to party finances it rather talks about qualification of a person who can contest elections. [10]

Any political party that fails to submit the audited return of election expenses is guilty of an offence punishable on conviction with a fine of N100, 000. Section 80 makes provision for the disbursement of grants to political parties that are contesting elections. It provides that 30% of the grant shall be distributed equally among the political parties before the election and the remaining 70% shall be shared among the political parties after the result of the election has been known, in proportion to the number of seats won by each party in the National Assembly. [11]

Section 81 provides that the National Assembly may make an annual grant to political parties and 30% of such grants should be shared equally among the parties and the remaining 70% shall be shared among the political parties in proportion to number of seats won by each party in the National Assembly. [12]

Section 82 provides as follows No political party shall be eligible to receive a grant under section 93 unless it wins a minimum of 10 percent of the total votes cast in the local government election in at least two-thirds of the states of the federation. [13]

Section 93 which is referred to in the above provision has no such provisions Section 83 empowers the Commission to place the limitation on the amount of money or other assets, which an individual or corporate body can contribute to a political party. Also it stipulates for a record of all contributors [14]

The Companies and Allied Matters Act forbids corporate organizations from making political donations [15]. The above-mentioned provisions if properly applied will inject some semblance of sanity in our political environment but that does not mean that there are no rooms for improvement.

Section 226 [16] provides that the commission shall prepare and submit the annual report on the accounts and balance sheet of every political party to the National Assembly. The National Assembly is made up of partisan members who may not be free from bias in considering the reports. An independent body made up of non-partisan members should be in a better position to review such reports. The peculiar inclination of our politicians to place selfish and party interest above common good must not be overlooked

It is submitted that the penalty provided in sections 76, 77 and 78 of the 2002 Electoral Act are not stiff enough to deter parties from flouting the provisions of the law. Mere imposition of fine without more cannot adequately serve as an effective deterrent. The law should be tightened to disqualify such a party from taking part in the general elections. Our environment is one riddled by corruption and fraud. Nigerians are notorious for trivializing the provisions of the law; it then becomes necessary that in other to save our democracy very stiff penalties must be prescribed for serious offences. The penalties as applied presently have not been able to check the excesses of political parties and politicians.

The provisions of section 80 of the Electoral Act [17] which stipulates that the grant given to political parties should be shared before and after elections and on the latter instance in proportion to the seats the political parties have in the National Assembly destroys the sole aim of the grant which is to help the political parties especially the small ones contest election. Sharing 70% of the grant after election to successful parties empowers the bigger parties the more and does not promote fair and level playing ground.

This argument also applies to the provisions of sections 81 and 82 of the Electoral Act. [18] The reference made to wrong provisions in sections 79 and 82 portrays the carelessness and inefficiency of the draftsmen and the legislators who passed it into law. [19]

The Act in section 83 contradicts the provisions of section 308 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, which prohibits corporate bodies from making political donations. This provision of the Act amplifies the very careless attitude of the draftsmen and creates confusion in the political environment. Allowing corporate bodies to make political donation will open up ways for the sale of the seat of government. It creates room for money politics as seen in the last election. Till date INEC has not placed any limitation on the amount of money an individual or corporation can donate to political parties allowing room for money bags to hijack the political parties and even the government as seen in the drama which is unfolding in Anambra State.


Money is very fundamental to the activities of any political party. Insufficient finances will cripple a political party and make them insignificant. On the other hand unlimited access to finance tend to give a party an unjust edge over other parties and turns the whole process into an auction where the highest bidder wins. Though it is not in all case that the richer political party wins but the truth is that it creates an unhealthy playing ground and has a tendency of corrupting the process and the government. The middle line is the political system where the political parties are equipped to reasonably contest and win election, and in which money is just one of the tools and not the only means for electoral victory.

The Nigerian environment is saddled with the two extreme positions. While some parties can barely pay for their secretariat, others have unlimited access to funds capable of enabling them corrupt the electoral process. Many reasons have been adduced to account for this situation, chiefly amongst which is that our electoral laws are not adequate to check the excesses of the politicians.

Accepted that there is room for improvement in our electoral laws, it is only a part of the problem. The greatest problem with political finance in Nigeria is that the laws in force are not implemented. The Independent National Electoral Commission in the last elections never implemented the laws relating to disclosure. Nobody was questioned for retaining foreign donations. The Independent National Electoral Commission did not, contrary to the provisions of the Electoral Act, place any cap on the amount of money any individual or corporation could donate to political parties. The toothless nature of the relevant agencies gave politicians the leeway to flout the rules concerning party and campaign finance. The resultant effect was that the political environment was saturated with money and government, political parties and politics in general is seen as the easiest way to make money. The economic hardship in the country and the opulent lifestyle of politician convinced the electors that electoral process was a time and means to acquire wealth. Thus manipulations and rigging of all sorts occured. The will of the people is not reflected in the polls. Thus the government, which is not elected by the people, cannot work for the people. [20] Democracy in this environment cannot exist.

Another mode of seeing the implementation of our political finance laws is through litigation and prosecution. Two issues are involved: civil and criminal. Under the Electoral Act, once crime is involved, the law places a burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Under section 144 of the Electoral Act [21], the Attorney General shall consider any recommendation made to him or to a tribunal by the Commission, with respect to whether or not to prosecute any person mentioned in a petition.

It is also trite that non-compliance with the Electoral Act is a ground for electoral petition. But the central issue is who has the locus in this type of case? Under section 133 (1) of the Electoral Act,[22] an election petition can be presented by one or more of the following, (a) a candidate to the election (b) a political party which participated in the election.

The list is closed, hence, what becomes the fate of voter, as was the case in Egolum v Obasanjo. [23] The restriction of locus standi has continued to impose limitation on justice. To date, no recommendation for prosecution has been given by any tribunal and ordinary Nigerians are stopped from questioning the activities of individuals who flout the rules on the ground of locus standi. A liberal interpretation of locus standi will favour the search for even handed justice in Nigeria.

The evils of unchecked political finance haunt the government in that the government, which is a product of a flawed electoral process, cannot offer much to the people. The government will want to protect the status quo, which brought it into power, and this makes reforms almost impossible.


Fashioning and implementing adequate political finance regulatory systems has been a source of concern and controversy the world over. One accepted notion is that the peculiarities of every environment must be considered. As such no political finance law could be said to be foolproof; what is canvassed is for a system that can guarantee reasonable transparency and competition amongst political parties.

The United States

In the United States, a cap is placed on the amount of money any individual can contribute to a political party and the parties must disclose the source of such donation. The maximum donation an individual can give to a political party or candidate is $1000 an equivalent of about N140, 000 in Nigeria. For any donation, which is above $200, the name, address and other information about the individual are furnished by the party to the relevant agency. This practice in the U.S is in relation to federal election. The respective states in the U.S have various political finance laws, some of which are similar to the federal law. The information relating to donations are disclosed or filed with the relevant agency by political parties and Political Action Committees (PAC) who raise money for candidates. The efficiency of this system is further guaranteed by the strict enforcement of sanctions on defaulters. The practice of disclosure has a lot of advantages amongst which are

(a) Disclosure facilitates the enforcement of campaign regulation and helps to check corruption

(b) It increases accountability

(c) A transparent system engenders trust

(d) Disclosure enables a polity to better understand its regularities. [24]

Rose Ackerman notes that a democratic political system must find a way to finance political parties without encouraging the sale of politicians to contributors [25]

The practice of placing limitations on donations by individuals clearly achieves this. The Americans have taken a step further in their bid to establish a transparent political finance system with the recent bill sponsored by Senator Russell Feingold et al. In America, it is called, the Clean Money Campaign.

Clean Money Campaign Reform offers a new approach to financing elections by providing candidates an alternative to soliciting special interests or spending personal funds to run for public office. Under CMCR, candidates who voluntarily reject private money and limit their spending receive a fixed and equal amount of campaign funding from a publicly financed fund.

American voters are angry about the existing campaign finance system and want to see it completely overhauled. They believe that electoral campaigns have become too expensive, special interests have too much influence, candidates spend too much time chasing money, good people who lack money or connections don’t have a fair chance to compete for office, and there are too many loopholes for big money to slip.

Instead of having to woo fat-cat contributors, potential Clean Money candidates would have to woo the public to collect a predetermined number of small donations to demonstrate real constituent support. And once they receive their Clean Money financing, they would not be raising or spending any private money whatsoever. As a result, grassroots candidates and electoral coalitions would finally be able to compete on an equal footing on the basis of program, ideas, party affiliation and leadership ability, not money. A number of states in America have adopted this practice.

The Philippines

Laws on financial contributions refer specifically to elections. They are silent on contributions to political parties not related directly to elections. The relevant law on elections is Republic Act 7166 passed in 1991. Parts of this law were amended in RA9006 passed in July 2000. COMELEC resolutions 3636 and 4170 promulgated just before the May 2001 provide implementing rules and regulations. These laws are so strict that if they were observed, candidates would have to self-finance campaigns. Contributions from the following are explicitly banned by the COMELEC: [26]

1. Public or private financial institutions. (This includes contributions from all banks, though legitimate loans are allowed.)

2. Operators of public utilities or holders of licenses to exploit the nation’s natural resources. (This would include all mining, logging, and deepsea fishing companies, and operators of public utilities like electric companies and transport enterprises.)

3. Suppliers or contractors of goods and services to the government. (This would cover virtually all the big construction companies engaged in infrastructure, construction or contractual supplies to the government.)

4. Recipients of franchises, incentives, exemptions, allocations, concessions or similar privileges by the government. (This would cover virtually all the major franchises, concessionares etc. as well as radio and television companies insofar as they need a franchise to use the airwaves, and all beneficiaries of tax exemptions and other forms of incentives.)

5. Beneficiaries of loans or other forms of accommodations by the government in excess of P100,000.

6. Educational institutions, which have received public funds in excess of P100, 000.

7. Government officials and employees, and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. (This covers practically everybody working in government.)

8. Foreigners and foreign corporations. (This will also cover all Filipinos living overseas who have acquired foreign citizenship)

Candidates for president and vice president can spend P10 per registered voter. Their parties can spend a counterpart fund of P5 per voter. With 35 million voters, the presidential candidate and his party can spend P525 million (roughly US$10 million at 2001 exchange rates). Other candidates are allowed to spend only P3 per voter. Thus senatorial candidates who run on a national level are allowed to spend P105 million. Independent candidates are allowed to spend more since candidates’ parties are allowed to spend another P5 per voter per candidate.

There is no state financial support for candidates and parties. The closest that might be considered ‘support’ is the provision in the ‘Fair Elections Act’ (RA9006) passed in 2000 for the COMELEC27 to buy media time and space for the use of candidates.

Every candidate and treasurer of the political party must submit within 30 days after election day a “full, true and itemized statement” of all contributions and campaign expenditures (RA7166). The statement must contain:

• Amount of contribution, date of receipt and the full name and address of the contributing person or organization;

• Amount of expenditure, the date full name and address of the person to whom the payment was made and the purpose of the expenditure; and

• Any unpaid obligation, its nature and amount and to whom said obligation is owed.

• Under the Fair Election Practices Law (RA9006) passed February 2001 which lifted the ban on political advertisements, contracts for the use of media for political advertisements have to be submitted to the COMELEC. (Adversario:2001)

In spite these provisions, the Electoral Agency has not been able to implement the laws. The cost of campaigning is rising every day and the process cannot be said to be transparent.

South Korea

The current regulation regime of political finance largely centers around the power and functions of the National Election Commission. The NEC regulation is mainly composed of two elements: (1) fiscal reports made by parties, support groups, and candidates, and (2) investigation into campaign activities and political money flow. First, the Political Finance Law requires all parties, support groups, and candidates to submit their annual fiscal reports to the National Election Commission by February 15 in each year. In addition to these regular reports, they are also required to make election campaign reports within 30 days after the election - presidential candidates report within 40 days after the election. Fiscal reports should include the listing of properties, listing of incomes and expenditures, receipts, and CPA’s examination summary.

The first problem with the fiscal report is that reported materials are not available for thorough examination by the public, academics, and relevant NGOs. Access to reported materials is quite limited. Relevant materials are open to the public only for three months and photocopying of materials are restricted even during that period Another problem with the current reporting system is that lists of contributors are not available to public investigation even though they are included in the reported materials. It constitutes a major barrier to enhancing transparency of political finance flow.

The other major aspect of regulation is ex post facto investigation. After reviewing reported materials, more than one thousand NEC officials along with IRS (Internal Revenue Service) officials conduct in-depth investigation into improper use of campaign money and illegal activities. Over a period of four months following the 2000 election, the NEC officials investigated the fiscal documents and campaign activities of 658 candidates. They even looked into account books of publishing companies and political marketing firms in several districts. The investigation has eventually led to referrals of 27 candidates and 69 campaign bursars for criminal prosecution.

Criminal investigation referred by the NEC has often led to severe punishment. For instance, seven members of National Assembly lost their seats as they were convicted for illegal campaigns and improper use of political money after the 1996 parliamentary election. Another thirteen members lost their seats after being convicted for illegal campaign practices after the 2000 election. This seems quite a severe sanction against politicians when compared to the situation in Japan and United States. For the 1997-2000 period, not a single member of the US Congress has lost his or her seat on charges of unlawful campaign and illegal campaign funding practices. In Japan, only three members of the National Diet have lost their seats for campaign fund-related charges during the period. If we look at fiscal report observation and ex post facto investigation, the Korean NEC seems quite powerful. It’s independence is guaranteed by the constitution. Appointment of the nine members of the NEC council is equally shared by the President (three), National Assembly (three) and the Chief Justice (three). The NEC has adequate legal authority necessary for effective enforcement. It includes authority to investigate financial reports, and to make referrals for criminal prosecution. [28]

In spite of the checks placed on political party, election in Korea is still very expensive and not entirely transparent. The Government has introduced subsidies for political parties and limitation on contributions made to parties and candidates. The dedication of relevant agencies in Korea in oversight function over party finances is highly commendable.


Political finance law can never be perfect. Every democracy has its own raging debate on what should be the standard. If the will of the majority is reflected in the outcome of elections, then the system should be given a pass mark. There is always a problem with whatever manner of electoral law established by any country. The American system of disclosure is criticized as nugatory to the practice of secret ballot in that when the name of a contributor is published, it becomes public knowledge that he has supported a particular candidate and allows room for intimidation if the candidate who wins decides to even with individuals that supported other candidates financially.

Government provision of subsidy for political parties is also riddled with government beaurocracy. There maybe cases of delayed release of funds and unfairness in disbursement of funds. Placing caps on donations to political parties, noble as it may sound, is very hard to implement since politicians are very good at exploiting loopholes in the law. Be that as it may, there is general consensus that unregulated political finance can destroy the foundation of democracy.

One of the best means of ensuring transparency in political finance is the strict implementation of the relevant laws. There is the need to give effect to the law irrespective of how inadequate they may be. The number of members of parliament in Korea who lost their seats for contravening the campaign finance rules portrays a nation that respects the rule of law. No matter how good reforms are, they are worthless if not implemented.

Reform takes time to achieve impact. America’s disclosure laws have been operational for 25 years; we should not expect to have ours as efficient as theirs in a flash. We must be willing to experiment with reform in other to build a reliable political finance regulatory system.


1. The composition of the INEC must be reviewed to ensure independence and efficiency. The practice in Korea whereby the Chief Justice, the President and the National Assembly each nominate three out of the nine members of the Electoral Commission is advocated. The financial independence of the body must also be guaranteed by the Constitution and strictly implemented. This will enable the body to have the teeth to bite especially in their oversight function with respect to political finance.

2. The provisions of section 83 (2) [29] should be amended to provide for the submission to INEC of the list of contributors and the amount they contributed by political parties and candidates. It should also be enough ground to disqualify a party or a candidate from participating in future elections if such a person falsifies or refuses to furnish the records.

3. Section 133 [30] should be amended to allow electors and indeed any other interested party to challenge the outcome of elections. Contravention of election finance rules should not just be sanctioned by fine alone but should be enough ground for the electoral tribunals to annul election returns.

4. Grants to political parties to help them with their electoral campaign should be shared equally between the parties before the elections. Withholding some part of the grant until after election defeats the aim of the grant. The provisions of section 81 of the Act should be amended in this respect. [31] Section 82 of the Act should be amended to provide for equal share of the grants among operational political parties. This will enable the smaller parties to have enough resources to build up structures and will remove the undue advantage presently enjoyed by the bigger parties.

5. INEC should immediately place a limit on the amount of money any individual or corporation is allowed to donate to a party. The present practice in the U S, which places the limit of donation by an individual at $1000, is instructive. Section 308 [32] which prohibit corporations from making any donation should be strictly implemented not just to protect the seat of government but also to save the shareholders money. It should also be made a ground for the winding up of a company.

6. Perhaps the greatest reform to our political finance laws is the strict implementation of the laws. There must be the political will by the appropriate authorities to give effect to the law.

7. The Clean Money Campaign as presently practiced by some states in America should be adopted and experimented.

1. 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
2. Agbakoba Olisa Where did we go wrong? A review of the 2003 Elections. Unpublished
3. Companies and Allied Matters Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990
4. Electoral Act 2002
5. Onyekpere, Eze, “The Socio Economic Imperatives Of Economic Reform In Nigeria”, paper delivered at a Policy Roundtable on Election Probity and Conflict Management in Nigeria”, organised by the Concerned Professionals, Abuja October 29-30, 2003
6. Jinadu, L. Adele, “Electoral Integrity: Assuring the Independence of Electoral Bodies”, paper delivered at a Policy Roundtable on Election Probity and Conflict Management in Nigeria organised by the ‘Concerned Professionals’, Abuja October 29-30, 2003
7. Rocamora, Joel, “Campaign Finance and the Future of Philippine Political Parties”, paper presented at the Democracy Forum for East Asia conference on political finance in Asia [The Sejong Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy], Seoul, South Korea, June 2001
8. Jongryn, Mo and Jaung, H. “Analysis of Political finance in Korea”, paper presented at the Democracy Forum for East Asia conference on political finance in Asia [The Sejong Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy], Seoul, South Korea, June 2001
9. Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael, “Political Reform and DemocracyMajor Challenges for Reformers and scholars”, Thematic paper presented at the Democracy Forum for East Asia conference on political finance in Asia [The Sejong Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy], Seoul, South Korea, June 2001
10. Wilcox, Clyde “Transparency and Disclosure in Political Finance: Lessons from the USA”, paper presented at the Democracy Forum for East Asia conference on political finance in Asia [The Sejong Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy], Seoul, South Korea, June 2001.


1.Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, ‘Political Reform and Democracy- Major Challenges for Reformers and Scholars’, Thematic paper at conference on Political Finance and Democracy in Asia cosponsored by the Sejong Institute, Sungnam, Korea, and the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington D.C., U.S.A at Seoul, South Korea June 2001
2. L. Adele Jinadu ‘Electoral Integrity: Assuring the Independence of Electoral Bodies’, Policy Roundtable on Election Probity and Conflict Management in Nigeria organised by the Concerned Professionals, Abuja, October 29-30 2003
3. Olisa Agbakoba ‘Where Did We Go Wrong ( A Review of the 2003 General Election)’ [unpublished]
4. 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
5. ibid
6. 2002 Electoral Act
7. ibid
8. ibid
9. ibid
10. ibid
11. Ibid
12. ibid
13. ibid
14. ibid
15. section 308
16. 1999 Constitution
17. 2002
18. ibid
19. Electoral Act 2002
20. Eze Onyekpere ‘The Socio Economic Imperatives of Economic Reform in Nigeria’, paper delivered at a Policy Roundtable on Election Probity and Conflict Management in Nigeria. Othe organised by the Concerned Professionals Abuja, October 29-30 2003
21. 2002
22. ibid
23. (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt 611) 355.
24. Clyde Wilcox, ‘Transparency and Disclosure in Political finance: Lessons from USA’; paper prepared for presentation at the Democracy Forum for East Asia conference on political finance, June, 2001, Sejong Institute, Seoul, Korea.
25. ibid
26. Joel Rocamora ‘Campaign Finance and the Future of Philippine Political Parties’, November 1 2001
27. This is the equivalent of Nigeria’s Independent National Election Commission
28. The analysis of political finance in Korea is adapted from work done by H Jaung, of Chungang University and Jongryn Mo, of Yonsei University
29. 2002 Electoral Act
30. ibid
31. ibid
32. Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990